In personality psychology researchers empirically investigate sources of accuracy by using information about both the perceiver – the person whose accuracy we are evaluating – and the target – the person the perceiver is accurate about. Using a round robin design – where every participant rates and is rated by every other participant, as well as peer and self-report ratings of each participant, researchers can examine and quantify the relative predictive power of different factors.
Participants rate themselves and others on different traits. Ratings are more accurate if the perceiver’s ratings of the target match an average of the target’s peer and self-report ratings. Researchers can, for example, simultaneously compare:
- normativity – the actual prevalence of the trait in a group
- perceived similarity to the perceiver – the influence of distinctive traits about the perceiver (calculated by adjusting the average of the perceiver’s peer and self-reports for the average self-report for the entire group.)
- distinctiveness – the extent to which the target is higher or lower than average on the trait (calculated by adjusting the average of the target’s peer and self-reports for the average self-report for the entire group) (Human & Biesanz, 2011).
Theoretically, the influence of normative accuracy – the extent to which an individual references others against a norm – should be higher when perceivers and targets share a cultural background. On the one hand, normative accuracy is the product of experience. The more muembers of a group you meet, the better you estimate average behaviors. On the other hand, cultural norms also shape who we seek to become and how we express ourselves.
Perceived similarity, on the other hand, can bias the perceiver towards seeing her own distinctive traits in others, at least when she likes or in some way identifies with those others. For example, an ethnographer may tend to see informants that he likes as being more similar to him than they actual are and informants that he dislikes as either being contrasted against his perceptions of himself or more similar to his perception of the “average” informant.
When perceptions of normativity are less established, however, the target’s distinctiveness should be less biasing, given that the ethnographer may not know what traits are distinctive and what traits are common. In other words, as the ethnographer’s perception of the actual averages for the group of informants changes, the roles of similarity and distinctiveness may change as well.
One takeaway for the ethnographer, then, is to exercise greater caution and give attention to the influence of presumed normative behaviors, perceived similarity (or lack thereof), and target distinctiveness. However, where a round robin design is practical, the ethnographer could also apply this observational research to the field. Given a culturally-validated scale, the ethnographer could compare the respective roles of these different influences on person perception across cultures. Other analysis could compare normative accuracy as determined by the actual average ratings for the groups to stereotypic accuracy – as determined by participant ratings of an imaginary “average person.”
This quantified data could be used to contextualize participant observation and in depth interviews.
Other Considerations – What is Accuracy?:
Accuracy is multi-dimensional. For example, if asked to judge the prevalence of a certain trait in different social groups, a person could have poor absolute accuracy. In that case, they might consistently underestimate or overestimate the prevalence in each group. However, they might still have good relative accuracy – judging the differences between groups well. As in the discussion above, accuracy is a continuous variable and it can increase or decrease over time. Our stereotyping intervention, for example, targeted absolute accuracy for a target social group. It could be expanded to target absolute accuracy for both the target’s social group and for the perceiver’s. Relative accuracy would then take care of itself.
Further, statistical measures of accuracy are blind to process. Other research examines how an observer learns about the group’s average rating on any trait. More research can disentangle the roles of shared social-desirability concerns, self-stereotyping, and other culturally-accessible influences on the self concept. These shared concerns could, for example, lead participants to report being more similar without actually being more similar.
Considering this relative complexity, stereotyping and prejudice interventions have to choose their target:
- Improving the validity and reliability of the process by which we judge individual targets and target groups?
- Improving the absolute accuracy of these judgments?
- Improving the relative accuracy of these judgments?
- Improving accuracy for certain traits, but not for others? (Accuracy may differ by trait).
Social scientists use the word “attitude” to refer to a positive or negative impression of some specific thing. That thing could be internal – most people have a negative attitude towards physical pain, for example. It could also be external. A stereotype is either a positive or negative attitude towards members of a social category. Prejudice, as I will be talking about it, is a negative attitude towards a person based on their membership in a social category. For a fuller look at stereotyping, click.
Regarding attitudes, decades of carefully designed experiments (Bohner & Dickel, 2011) ask the following questions:
- When we take an attitude in the moment, how much of our positive or negative feeling is driven by our memories, how much by other thoughts, feelings, and experiences that we are having at the same time?
- How complex are our attitudes? How complex is the thing we are reacting to? Do we feel ambivalent about it? Do we pay attention to different features of it in different contexts? Do we have an overall impression or are we still making up our minds?
- Do our attitudes reflect our most important, foundational beliefs and perspectives on the world?
- Do we think that our attitude is legitimate? Do we accept it and agree with it? Are we proud of it? Or do we think that we’re being unfair or even immoral?
- Do we think a lot about our attitude? Do we try to shape it in the moment?
- Do we act on our attitude?
- What would change our minds?
The purpose of these decades of research has mainly been a) to better understand how attitudes relate to behavior and b) to understand how to change destructive or unwanted attitudes.
We tend to measure attitudes by asking people to agree or disagree with a statement on a bipolar likert scale. Explicit measures are subject to social desirability concerns and, particularly when doing cross-cultural research, reference group effects. In understanding reference group effects as they apply to surveys, imagine a 7-point scale that asks you to do the following:
Please rate your agreement with the following statement –
“It is personally important to me to be nonprejudiced.”
In answering that question, you have to decide whether you “Agree very much” or “Agree” or “Disagree very much.” However, what is it to be nonprejudiced? Personal perceptions of cultural standards necessarily shape your answer.
Despite concerns about reference groups and social desirability, many explicit measures produce reliable – consistent – responses over time. In the absence of experimental manipulations, most people will respond to the same question similarly when they first answer it and when they answer it again a week or several weeks later.
In understanding the attitude, we can also directly ask people about:
- the personal importance of their attitudes
- whether they feel they have an attitude that reflects a clear stance
- whether they feel that their attitude is the correct one to hold.
By asking participants to reflect on their attitudes, we can better predict the stability of the attitude, whether they will act on it, and how they will respond to people who disagree with them.
Attitude extremity (distance from the midpoint on the scale) and attitude accessibility (amount of time it takes to answer the survey question) can be calculated from the original question without necessitating additional questions. Attitude extremity may reflect both passion and automaticity – people may report more extreme attitudes when they have stronger emotional responses. They may also report more extreme attitudes when they are responding on first instinct, without taking the time to have a “sober second thought.”
Attitude accessibility, on the other hand, can reflect both difficulty interpreting the question and actual difficulty or ease deciding how you feel about something.
Because our deliberate answer on a survey may be different from our initial feeling, there are also numerous implicit measures of attitudes. These measures all attempt to gauge one’s degree of negativity or positivity in a way that is unobtrusive and more difficult for the participant to control. Numerous measures have been developed (see Fazio & Olson, 2003 and Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014 for reviews) to various degree of success. They tend to take two forms. In one, the participant’s positive or negative feelings facilitate responding to other positive or negative stimuli. In the second, positive or negative feelings are attributed to a neutral stimulus – a Chinese ideograph, when the participants is not familiar with those ideographs – for example. Various semantic versions of implicit measures – looking at the strength of associations between different concepts – have been designed as well.
Explicit and implicit measures, taken together, can improve your ability to predict whether people will act on their attitudes, how they will respond to attitude-relevant information, and how they will interact with people who disagree with them. If there is implicit-explicit discrepancy, for example, participants may try to resolve this discrepancy by being more sensitive to relevant information and processing that information more carefully. Implicit measures may be better predictors of behavior when a participant is a) indecisive (an undecided voter, for example), b) under time pressure (culling a stack of résumés for a job), or c) making complex, multiply-determined judgments (a hiring decision, for example). Explicit measures, on the other hand, may be sufficient or even superior predictors when a) implicit and explicit measures are congruent, or b) the person is making a decision based on a limited number of variables and has the time to process relevant information.
Individual survey questions may introduce noise – there’s rarely a perfect question that will be interpreted the same way by all people. Individuals may also tend to fill out any given question in certain ways, liking more moderate or more extreme responses, for example. Both of these factors introduce noise.
However, with enough questions and enough people providing data, you can deal with the first issue by identifying clusters of questions that tap into the same general idea. You can deal with the second issue by administering the survey to many different people and looking at correlations with other surveys and behavioral measures.
We can also use this process to identify differences between groups – if questions cluster for some groups but not for others – we have to think carefully about why this might be the case, why the same survey questions might tap into different ideas for different groups of people.
We can then compare the survey response to what we learned from our participant observation. Do differences in the language that people use to talk about race show up as actual differences in survey response? Do similarities show up as actual similarities?
There are numerous surveys available to tap into prejudice, stereotyping, and interpersonal motivation. Commonly used scales include the Modern Racism Scale (McConahey, 1986), the Pro and Anti-Black Attitudes Questionnaire (Katz & Haas, 1988), Dunton and Fazio (1995)’s Motivation to Control Prejudice Reactions scale, and Plant and Devine (1998)’s Internal and External Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice. These surveys have been extensively studied – predicting a variety of behavioral traits including reactions to African American authors and speakers and in person interracial interactions.
These surveys, in general, focus on negative attitudes towards African Americans as a group (with the exception of the Pro and Anti-Black Attitudes Questionnaire, which considers positive and negative attitudes).
The Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions scale assumes that people have stereotype-driven reactions and seek to control them. The Internal and External Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice scale assumes that these attempts at acting non-prejudiced can be driven by internal (personal) and external (social) reasons.
Internally-driven people, for example, are more likely to act from an egalitarian framework (Johns, Cullum, Smith, & Freng, 2008). This egalitarian framework treats individuals as individuals. Membership in a social category is acknowledged as a potential influence on what an individual becomes. However, for an egalitarian, the individual is best understood as a unique entity, the product of many, interacting, factors.
Other researchers contrast multicultural ideologies – ideologies that acknowledge that belonging to different social categories shapes your experience – with colorblind ideologies – perspectives that judge every individual by the same standard, regardless of what factors lead them to be who they are.
Planning Our Intervention:
As planned, our intervention will focus on those individual who attribute traits to all members of a group based on observations of representations of the group in the media. We want to see if we can get that person to shift their perspective. Perhaps quixotically, we want that individual to attribute traits to most members of the group based on empirically established means and standard deviations.
To do so – we would want to know the specific content of their prejudice, whether they feel any personal or social pressures to avoid being prejudiced, and whether colorblind or multicultural ideologies appeal to them. Each of these factors could influence how they interact with our intervention.
For example, someone who is purely externally (but not internally) motivated to respond without prejudice tends to self-report a greater number of and more extreme negative attitudes towards African Americans. She tends to demonstrate higher levels of implicit – automatic or unobtrusively measured – prejudice (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Hausmann & Ryan, 2004; Amodio, Devine, & Eddie Harmon-Jones, 2008; Plant & Devine, 2009; Schlauch, Lang, Plant, Christensen, & Donohue, 2009). When talking with someone who happens to be African American, she engages in fewer approach-oriented behaviors (she smiles less, asks fewer questions, and makes less eye contact). Further, she is consciously aware of her concern to avoid appearing prejudice and anticipates being less engaged, even before the interaction (Plant, Devine, & Peruche, 2010). They may also be less likely to pay attention to even a racially-irrelevant message when it is attribute to an African American source (Sude & Rios, 2011, conference presentation).
From this portrait, we can infer that it would be difficult to change how this socially (but not personally) motivated respond without prejudice person thinks about race. In order to do so, we would want to increase her personal motivation to change her mind. We would also want to refrain from making her anxious, refrain from signaling that she should take an avoidant, disengaged approach to our intervention.
We could appeal to values that are race-irrelevant, such as intelligence of sound-reasoning. We could then shape her critical thinking and her recognition of lower quality thinking in a way that is race-irrelevant. We could then embed information about race within a wider discussion of using statistics to make more nuanced interpretations of the social world.
If she doesn’t value intelligence or sound-reasoning, we could instead offer an intervention that directly targets her intergroup anxiety – one that will alleviate anxiety and provide effective strategies for smooth and at the same time authentic interracial interaction.
What variables are relevant to my postulated practical question of how to change people’s use of stereotyping, with regard to racial attitudes?
Well, first I brainstorm a set of variables.
Let’s look at an output from that process:
What are the different characteristics of stereotyping that I see around me?:
- Thinking of individuals as belonging to the same “group” or being from the same category of people.
- Attributing traits to either a) all members of that group or b) most members of that group.
- Attributing traits based on a) observation of a single member of the group, b) observations from an initial encounter with multiple members of the group, c) observations based on the totality of encounters with group members, d) observation of representations of the group in the media, e) popular ways of talking about the group, f) traits attributed to the group that help justify group-based inequalities, g) traits that group members have by definition – believing in Jesus and being a practicing evangelical Christian, for example, h) observations based on a statistical average, i) observations based on a statistical average, taking into account the variability around that average.
With two ways of looking at 2 and nine ways of looking at 3, we already have 18 possible definitions of stereotyping, just from one brainstorming session by one person. In choosing to change the way people stereotype, we have to target a particular type of stereotyping and either eliminate it or change it into a different type of stereotyping.
For example, I might want to take someone who takes 3-d (observations of a group in the media) and infers 2-a (that all members of a group has that trait), and shift them to 3-i (data driven observations about the mean and standard deviation for that group) and 2-b (applied to the way they think about most people in that group).
Ok – we have a goal – now what are different ways of measuring these variables before we design our intervention?
I tackle socially-relevant questions and compare different methodological approaches to answering them.
My specialities are social psychology (M.A. University of Chicago, M.A. University of British Columbia), communication (Ph.D. The Ohio Stat University), and cultural anthropology (BA with honors Darmouth College). The first three required specialization in quantitative research, emphasizing rigorous statistical training and the use of subtle experimentation to identify key variables for understanding human behavior. You may have heard of a “crisis” in the social sciences. I prefer to think of it as growing: As social scientists, we have to be honest about the limitations of our tools and strive to overcome these limitations.
Dealing with the complexity of human behavior is inherently difficult. We are unable to have the same level of certainty that a physicist or chemist may have (and even drug companies have had great trouble replicating key, published and oft-cited, findings in their field). In order to detect a reliable pattern that is consistent across situations, the best human-behavior studies would have thousands of people doing hundreds of tasks, a practical difficulty that is only occasionally surmountable.
All is not lost, however. Even a smaller study can highlight an important relationship between different factors. At that point, it’s the field’s duty to conduct more research, replicate or fail to replicate the result, and to try to understand whether the initial result was due to chance or due to a third variable that moderates (that influences the strength of) the effect.
Looking from an interdisciplinary perspective, however, we can be inspired by laboratory-studied relationships and look for independent evidence of their relevance to “the real world.” The laboratory allows us to take a micro-view, to get at what people can’t or won’t tell us about themselves. We can then take these findings to the field and look for evidence for or against the laboratory results.
As a cultural anthropologist working with the Maori, New Zealand’s indigenous people, I was keenly aware of the fact that my cultural narratives, as well as the narratives the Maori used to describe themselves, drove the questions that I asked. I was able to ask questions that pitted these potential interpretations against one another and to record the response of individual Maori informants. Were they skeptical of the narrative? Did it make sense to them? What was their emotional response? Were some members of the community more open to my account than others? Were they open to the account, but did it strike them as novel? These are all questions an anthropologist asks.
As a communication scientists, I walk a middle ground between the controlled laboratory experiments of social psychology and the qualitative messiness of real world behavior. My collaborators and I manipulate websites carefully and observe average differences in behavior (e.g. selection of messages and time spent reading them). This step has both internal and external validity. However, we then use those differences in behavior to model observed changes in attitudes. We cannot say for certain that the behavior preceded the change in attitudes. Instead, attitudes may have shifted behavior. In our attempt to consider the wider implications of ecologically valid behavior, we lose some control.
Truly useful social science research is a balancing act.
For better or for worse, shaping the world in innovative ways requires an attention to both process and product, the navigation of multiple approaches, and a willingness to investigate and to challenge our most basic assumptions in a systematic way.
In the end, we all do the pragmatic thing. We all choose a side, take a stance, and act. However, we can do so humbly, aware of complexities, without blinders. We can do so boldly, honestly, and in a way that convinces others that we have selected the best response given what we know at the time.