There is an interesting chapter (which I link to here) by Stanovich on the “tripartite” mind that got me thinking about research, as well as being human.
Stanovich distinguishes, first, the Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS) which includes all automated parallel/associative processing. This is the set of systems that creates a “primary” representation of reality. They create the world as we initially perceive it – drawing on schemas as well as perceptual inputs. This is what dual systems theorists call System 1.
Second, he distinguishes the algorithmic mind – which creates secondary – “decoupled” representations. This is most clearly related to working memory capacity – our capacity to sustain representations in memory (and screen out distractions). He distinguishes two general abilities of the algorithmic mind, the second more sophisticated than the first. The first starts with the simplest model of the world that the person can come up with quickly, then adjusts that model, serially (one adjustment at a time). In social terms, this could be someone who is angry at their boss and who we advise to “correct” for different biases associated with anger. Basically, the angry person has one model, then we advise them to adjust it so that – if our advice is helpful – it better resembles the world.
There is a second ability of the algorithmic mind – to simulate different models of the world, and to select between them. This is a more cognitively-loading process. Intuitively, people are more likely to use this ability when they are thinking about the future. Even then, they’ll tend to want to default to a simpler process and start with a single model and then serially process it until they’re more confident in it. This approach will ultimately be more biased, assimilating or contrasting to the first impression. I think we’ve all found ourselves unable to fully break away from that initial model when forecasting future events.
Simulating and comparing multiple models could (should!) also be the process when people are perspective-taking. Rather than starting with a single model or schema (often a cultural schema) and then comparing their target’s behavior to that model (adjusting their impression of the target accordingly), people could start with multiple possible interpretations from different sources and rely on unfolding personal experience to distinguish the superior from the inferior models. Ethnographers and clinical psychologists become very good at this sort of thinking.
Last, in Stanovich’s theoretical model, is the reflective mind. This includes intentional, guiding goals, that a) can trigger the need to go beyond the TASS (the autonomous set of systems) and b) guide the algorithmic mind. People, of course, can differ in their tendency to override the TASS or to engage in single model vs. multi-model thinking. Measures like the Need for Cognition, the Need for Cognitive Closure, Personal Need for Structure, Actively Openminded Thinking, etc provide the researcher information.
I should, in closing, note that TASS-processing isn’t bad! Ideally, people would grow better at a) recognizing when TASS-processing will fail them and b) being mindful enough of their goals that they can judge when a model is 1) sufficiently detailed and 2) gives appropriate weights to different variables. The TASS, at least in perhaps too tightly controlled thin slicing studies, can be better at both “1” and “2.”
Daniel Sude, Ph.D. 